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Zurich, Switzerland
Stefan Feuerriegel
ETH Zurich,
Zurich, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
Individuals are becoming increasingly concerned with privacy. This curtails their willingness to
share sensitive attributes like age, gender or personal preferences; yet firms largely rely upon
customer data in any type of predictive analytics. Hence, organizations are confronted with a
dilemma in which they need to make a tradeoff between a sparse use of data and the utility from
better predictive analytics. This paper proposes a masking mechanism that obscures sensitive
attributes while maintaining a large degree of predictive power. More precisely, we efficiently
identify data partitions that are best suited for (i) shuffling, (ii) swapping and, as a form of
randomization, (iii) perturbing attributes by conditional replacement. By operating on data
partitions that are derived from a predictive algorithm, we achieve the objective of masking
privacy-sensitive attributes with marginal downsides for predictive modeling. The resulting
trade-off between masking and predictive utility is empirically evaluated in the context of
customer churn where, for instance, a stratified shuffling of attribute values impedes predictive
accuracy rarely by more than a percentage point. Our proposed framework entails direct
managerial implications as a growing share of firms adopts predictive analytics and thus requires
mechanisms that better adhere to user demands for information privacy.
Keywords: information privacy; data masking; perturbation; predictive analytics; tree methods

1

INTRODUCTION

Personal information is valuable to online services (Bansal et al., 2010); however,
individuals are increasingly concerned about their privacy. In fact, 82 percent of online users are
reluctant to share personal information and more than a third has already given false information
about themselves (Teltzrow and Kobsa, 2004). Information systems (IS) research has early
noticed the importance of privacy for users (Hann et al., 2007) and the resulting demands by
1
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practitioners for privacy-preserving technologies (e. g., Li and Raghunathan, 2014; Li and Sarkar,
2006, 2013).
Earlier research on privacy-preserving mechanisms can be distinguished by different goals,
regarding which type of data is concealed (Duncan and Lambert, 1989). On the one hand, a set of
methods has been developed in order to prevent identity disclosure, which is an important issue
when data is supposed to be shared anonymously between a data owner and a third party (e. g., Li
and Sarkar, 2013; Zhu et al., 2009). On the other hand, there is growing interest in so-called
information privacy, which deals with individual concerns about confidentiality of certain
sensitive attributes (Hann et al., 2007). This stream of literature acknowledges that certain data
need to be stored for operational or legal reasons. Examples could consist of online shopping
where billing addresses are needed for shipments or names need to be stored for tax audits.
However, for sensitive attributes, such as age or gender, users expect organizations to be prudent.
As part of their concerns about information privacy, users prefer sensitive attributes to be masked
instead of being stored with their original value.
Prior work has addressed information privacy, but the methods for data masking focus on
retaining important statistical properties (Li and Sarkar, 2006; Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006),
thereby ignoring the effect on predictive analytics. That is, privacy mechanisms must conceal
attributes deemed sensitive, but still afford the use of predictive insights. However, there is
reason to believe that even modest privacy gains almost completely destroy any analytical utility
(Brickell and Shmatikov, 2008). It appears as if both information privacy and predictive utility
cannot be achieved simultaneously and should rather be assumed mutually exclusive. This
motivates our research as follows.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: Designing a predictive framework for masking privacy-sensitive
attributes in a given dataset while maintaining predictive power.
In order to address our research objective, we propose a mechanism for protecting
information privacy in predictive analytics. Thereby, we solve the decision problem of
identifying attribute values that are best suited for masking by mitigating the effects on predictive
performance. We approach this problem by partitioning the data into groups. Within each
subgroup, masking is either accomplished by shuffling or swapping values between observations,
or by replacing values with noisy ones from intervals that are clever chosen but can potentially be
large. Our masking mechanism maintains some of the statistical properties from the underlying
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distribution such as summary statistics in the case of shuffling. More importantly though, it
makes a sparse use of data and perturbs sensitive attributes with little interferences concerning a
given prediction task.
Our framework is evaluated by adapting the notion of regret to data masking, thereby
obtaining a rigorous metric for assessing the loss in predictive power. As such, it complements
established measures for gains in information privacy. Taken together, they support data-driven
decision making by displaying the trade-off between information privacy and predictive
analytics.
We perform a series of computational experiments in order to study how our proposed
mechanism competes in a real-world setting. For this reason, we draw upon the task of predicting
churn, as privacy-sensitive attributes are known to be associated with considerable prognostic
capacity. This links to a direct trade-off between information privacy and predictive utility. For
instance, our swapping mechanism masks an unknown portion of approximately 80 % of all
values from a sensitive attribute, yet the changes in prediction performance (i. e., area under the
curve) remain below a single percentage point. We further compare our mechanism for data
masking across a variety of base classifiers in order to demonstrate that it consistently
accomplishes only marginal effects on our regret metric, which thus contributes to the
generalizability of mechanisms.
Our proposed prediction framework entails direct implications for individuals, IS
practitioners and managers. First, individuals benefit from the fact that sensitive attributes
become concealed before the data is permanently stored and eventually analyzed. Second, our
predictive framework facilitates firms that want to strengthen information privacy. Here it allows
firms to strategically choose a desired balance between a scarce use of sensitive data and
expected benefits from predictive analytics. Third, we find that information privacy and firm
utility are not incompatible and, with the necessary care in formulating the underlying decision
problem, both objectives can be achieved simultaneously. In fact, our regret metric enables
practitioners to assess the effects of perturbing sensitive information on firm utility
quantitatively.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes earlier attempts in privacypreserving analytics, revealing that these works are mostly concerned with anonymity and the
potential risk of re-identifying individuals, while there is a scarcity of mechanisms with the
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ability of data masking subject to preserving predictive utility. As a remedy, Section 3 proposes
our decision problems that reconciles both goals: predictive modeling with strategic data
masking. These mechanisms are then evaluated using a real-world study where churn is predicted
(Section 4). Our findings lends to direct implications for management and IS practice as
discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.

2
2.1

BACKGROUND
Information Privacy

There are several ways for firms to address privacy concerns. In recent years, differential privacy
has emerged as a rigorous solution to protect personal information by giving mathematical
guarantees about disclosure risks (Dwork, 2008). However, such high standards leave aside the
fact that privacy demands are heterogeneous with some individuals guarding their privacy and
others seeking convenience in more personalized service offerings through sharing personal
information (Hann et al., 2007). It is possible for organizations to address this heterogeneity by
catering to an individual’s perception of how sensitive data is being handled. For instance,
information practices (Culnan and Armstrong, 1999) and user control (Fusilier and Hoyer, 1980;
Stone et al., 1983) can reconcile different demands for information privacy. Accordingly, we
define information privacy as perceivable organizational efforts to conceal sensitive data about
individuals, irrespective of whether firms themselves or the user controls data dissemination.
By definition, our work concerns the relationship between organizations and individuals from
which they collect data. Individuals – in the sense “indivisible” – are uniquely identified by some
attributes as name, phone or social security number, the so-called identifying attributes. Though
anonymity matters a great deal to individuals, what they are more worried about is that their
sensitive attributes, such as salary, medical test rest results or sexual orientation, are not revealed
and related to their identity (Li and Raghunathan, 2014). Accordingly, privacy literature
distinguishes two kinds of disclosures: identity and attribute disclosure (Duncan and Lambert,
1989). Preventing identity disclosure is a considerable issue when releasing data for analytical
purposes to secondary users such as researchers (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008).
In order to address this issue, a large stream of literature began developing models which
minimize the re-identification risk when disseminating data (e. g., Li et al., 2007;
Machanavajjhala et al., 2006; Sweeney, 2002). However, the data owner himself often needs to
retain the identifiability of the individuals in his database. Therefore, keeping the risk of identity
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disclosure in mind, privacy-aware firms are also searching for mechanisms to mitigate the
disclosure of sensitive attributes.
Privacy-Preserving Data Masking
Adam and Worthmann (1989) classify masking algorithms in statistical databases into
four categories: conceptual, query restriction, data perturbation and output perturbation. For
analytics tasks, research has found that not all are applicable (Zhu et al., 2009). Whilst conceptual
approaches matter when designing privacypreserving data mining algorithms, our focus is on
data perturbation techniques. Nowadays, perturbation techniques are often categorized under a
more general notion of data masking techniques that include techniques beyond perturbation
(Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006). Below we summarize some concepts of masking models and
related privacy-preserving algorithms.
Carefully derived algorithms have been found to establish a very strong from of privacy.
Yet even though efficient solutions exist, they are often impractical (Yang et al., 2005).
Furthermore, cryptographic approaches rather deal with the problem of sharing or jointly
analyzing distributed databases with external parties, whereas the focus of this paper is the direct
relationship between a user and an organization.
Microaggregation follows the idea of aggregating micro data into broader groups that
provide anonymity to the individual on the group level. Some key concepts of anonymization
based on microaggregation include k-anonymity (Samarati and Sweeney, 1998), l-diversity
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2006) and t-closeness (Li et al., 2007). Data is said to be k-anonymous if
an individual record cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1 individual records. Unfortunately,
if a group of k individual records are indistinguishable, then an adversary is able to ascertain
confidential values of a known member even from a homogeneous group. Therefore, grouped
data is said to be additionally l-diverse if – simply put – there are at least l distinct values of the
confidential attribute in each group. However, if confidential attributes are subject to highly
skewed distributions, l-diversity can result in groups where the distribution of the confidential
attribute differs substantially from the overall distribution. In this case, analytical findings can
turn out to be misleading. Taking this problem into account, t-closeness requires that the distance
between the group and overall distribution of a confidential attribute does not exceed a certain
threshold t.
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LeFevre et al. (2006) presents algorithms that satisfy k-anonymity, optionally l-diversity,
but remain useful for classification or regression tasks. However, Brickell and Shmatikov (2008)
finds that their application is in fact destructive to utility. Li and Sarkar (2006) propose an
effective clustering-based method for masking categorical data. However, their method suffers
from a disadvantage pertaining to most other microaggregation methods, which create groups
where attribute similarity is greater within than between groups. This carries the risk of
confidential attribute disclosure. In response, Li and Sarkar (2013) build a minimum spanning
tree technique that creates groups where non-confidential attributes are similar, but confidential
attributes are well distributed.
Rather than aggregating data, perturbation techniques randomize the individual records,
e. g., by adding noise or shuffling attribute values. Shuffling preserves the marginal distribution
of the data, whereas it depends on the desired strength of privacy how adding noise will alter the
distribution. Both techniques have in common that inserting randomness will deprive data of
information. Therefore, a large stream of research has been dedicated to build algorithms and
models which transform data to ensure privacy and, simultaneously, keep it suitable for analytical
purposes. Aggarwal and Yu (2008) provide a comprehensive survey of privacy-preserving data
mining techniques, which includes – but is not limited to – perturbation.
The majority of privacy-preserving data masking is concerned with anonymity. However,
the presented techniques, such as perturbation, are adaptable to serve a different goal of
obscuring sensitive data as well (see e. g., Li and Sarkar, 2006; Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006).
This is important in the organizational context where identifying attributes need to be stored for
operational or legal reasons, and anonymity is thus no
longer attainable.
2.2

Research Gap

Privacy mechanisms are commonly developed with the premise of ensuring anonymity. Such
differentially private mechanisms establish scientific guarantees about the re-identification risk of
individuals (Cynthia Dwork, 2006; Dwork, 2008). While vigorous protection of identity is a
noble objective, it is overambitious in cases where organizations require identifying attributes for
operational purposes. None the less, they may feel obliged to react to individual concerns about
information privacy. For that reason, the field of privacy-preserving data mining has contributed
various algorithms to prevent disclosure of sensitive information (Aggarwal and Yu, 2008).
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Corresponding algorithms mask sensitive attributes and preserve statistical properties of the data
(Li and Sarkar, 2006; Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006). However, prior work does not take into
account predictive analytics, which is a considerable issue because transforming data can be
destructive to its utility (Brickell and Shmatikov, 2008). As a remedy, we develop a privacy
mechanism that masks attributes deemed sensitive but with marginal downsides for predictive
power.
Within the field of privacy-preserving data mining, there is no consistent way of quantifying
the effects of data masking on data utility. But lacking a measurement puts firms at risk of
forfeiting predictive utility without reaping the benefits of improved privacy. In this paper, we
adopt the mathematical concept of regret to quantify the loss in predictive utility from
transforming sensitive attributes under privacy considerations. A small regret informs firms about
idle privacy potential, whereas a large regret warns them about destructive effects on predictive
utility. Hitherto considered mutually exclusive, a comparison of regret emphasizes that there is a
trade-off between between privacy and predictive analytics.

3

METHOD DEVELOPMENT
3.1

Intuition

While privacy is important for users (Hann et al., 2007), predictive analytics still plays a
vital role for business (Fayyad et al., 1966). A frequent task in this discipline is classification, i.
e., predicting the class label for an observation from its attributes. Masking attributes most likely
impedes predictive accuracy because changing the attribute values corresponds to a loss in
information. Thus, organizational efforts to strengthen information privacy in the form of data
masking appear to run opposite to objectives in predictive analytics.
In order to resolve the conflicting goals of privacy and predictive utility, we postulate the
idea that certain subsets of the data (i. e., so-called partitions) can be identified where, on the one
hand, data masking is applied to conceal sensitive attributes. However, on the other hand, the
prediction label for the observations in the partition are fairly similar and, hence, the masking
operation has little effect on the overall predictive power. The underlying operations for masking
sensitive attributes can then follow common strategies from the literature, namely, (i) shuffling,
(ii) swapping, or (iii) replacing values.
Mathematically, we formalize the intuition behind our approach as follows. Let S refer to
the sensitive attributes prior and

after applying the masking operation. Further, let X denote all

Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San Francisco, December 13, 2018

7

Banholzer and Feuerriegel

Data Masking in Predictive Analytics

remaining attributes which are not sensitive but nevertheless reported. Then, the objective in
prediction is to estimate a model f that models Y based on S and X, i. e.,

The idea is that we partition the data (X,S) = D1 ∪ ... ∪ Dn into several disjoint subsets Di, i =
1,...,n with Di ∩ Dj = ∅ for i ≠ j. Within each partition Di, we expect that a different classifier f
that is trained with

’

(instead of S) will obtain a similar outcome to f, i. e.,

Hence, the original predictive ability is retained for each partition.
3.2

Data Masking

Table 1 illustrates the effects of several data masking techniques on the original data. For
instance, shuffling attribute values between observations is a particularly attractive technique in
data masking because it perturbs the data without transforming the marginal distribution of an
attribute (Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006).
We first consider optimizing shuffling and swapping as permutation techniques for data
masking. Let s = (s1,...,sd) be a vector of d = |Di| expressions for sensitive attribute Sk in partition
Di and let Π(s) be a permutation of s with

being the set of all possible permutations. Intuitively,

we would want the permuted attribute values to be very different from the original ones. We
achieve this goal by choosing the permutation that minimizes an equally weighted mean of
Kendall’s τ rank and Pearson’s ρ linear correlation such that the average correlation approximates
zero.
In contrast to permuting the original attribute values, replacing perturbs data through
conditional replacement by sampling from an arbitrary distribution. For simplicity, we assume a
uniform distribution, where the upper and lower bound correspond to the partition boundaries.2
3.3

Tree-Based Partioning

We suggest estimating a decision tree to accomplish our goal of masking sensitive
attributes while mitigating the effects on predictive utility. This is because decision trees are very
powerful in both partitioning and predicting, which previous studies have demonstrated in the
context of privacy (Estivill-Castro and Brankovic, 1999; Li and Sarkar, 2009; Lindell and Pinkas,
2

Replacing is used only for numerical variables. For categorical variables, we pertain to permutation techniques.
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2002; Vaidya and Clifton, 2005). For instance, Li and Sarkar (2009) note their ability to mine
sensitive information. In response, they propose a tree pruning approach for protection from treebased classification attacks. Estivill-Castro and Brankovic (1999) observe that a permutation of
the class labels within a data partition will not alter the assigned majority by the tree, but create
uncertainty about the true class label of an individual. Finally, Lindell and Pinkas (2002) and
Vaidya and Clifton (2005) develop tree-based privacy-preserving algorithms for horizontally and
vertically distributed databases respectively.
In this work, we make use of the decision tree model developed in (Therneau et al., 1997).
Based on recursive partitioning, data is recursively split into subgroups until a stopping criterion
terminates the process. The path this observation traverses in the tree then determines the class
label for an observation. Similar observations traverse the same path and thus each leaf node in
the tree forms a group of observations; the data partition.
Small partitions or sharp constraints impede data masking because there is limited potential
to permute or replace attribute values. This possibly leads to insufficient levels of information
privacy. Naturally, the number of observations in a partition and the number of constraints are
linked to the size of the decision tree. Recursive partitioning offers several ways for controlling
the size of the tree. For instance, one can impose a minimum number of observations before
making another split (Therneau et al., 1997). More commonly, a larger tree is grown first and
subsequently pruned by removing splits that increase model complexity disproportionately.
Intended to prevent overfitting (Therneau et al., 1997), pruning can also be employed to enforce
stronger data masking.
3.4

Regret Metric for Predictive Performance

The objective of our masking mechanism is to solve a decision problem for organizations
with a limited privacy budget. More formally, let D be the organization’s database. After
masking sensitive attributes in D with technique Tj, j ∈ {1,...,m}, the data is transformed to D˜j.
Now, assume the firm has a classification task where it wants to accurately predict the binary
binary class label Y and denote with Yˆ the predicted probability for the positive label. The
following procedure is routine in Machine Learning. First, split D and D˜j each into a training and
test set. Second, fit a model separately on the training sets of the original and transformed data.
Third, predict Yˆ on the test sets with

being the predictions for the original and

being the
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predictions for the transformed data. We evaluate these predictions with the area under the
receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), which is a function of

and Y .

A transformation of D is a decision to add privacy, potentially at the cost of firm utility.
Therefore, the transformation should minimize the regret of making this decision. Measuring
firm utility as the performance in the corresponding classification task, regret R is defined as the
difference in AUC obtained using the original and transformed data
.

(5)

Intuitively, it measures the loss in predictive performance by applying masking technique Tj. The
optimal masking technique Tj∗ is then found via

Since our masking mechanism is designed to maintain the predictive performance of the
underlying classifier, we evaluate it more rigorously on a set of models; random forest, support
vector machine as well as lasso, ridge and logistic regression (see following Section 4).

4

COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
4.1

Empirical Setup

In our empirical evaluation, we draw upon the task of churn prediction as this presents a
common, yet challenging, undertaking in IS research. It is important for the firm to know which
individuals will continue to purchase and who will churn. For the latter group, the firm may want
to approach them proactively, e. g., by offering specific deals. Hence, the task of predicting churn
is directly linked to a case where predictive utility can obtain substantial financial benefits, but
where users might not want to reveal their true personal information.
We specifically obtained a proprietary dataset as it better reflects the characteristics of data
in real-world settings, such as a wide set of predictors and class imbalances. For that latter reason,
we later draw upon the area under curve metric, as it is not sensitive to imbalances in the outcome
variable. One might argue that the number and volume of purchases might present also very
sensitive attributes. Therefore, we exclude these attributes from our masking algorithms.
Table 1 lists the model variables from our dataset. For the purpose of our analysis, we treat age
and gender as sensitive attributes. We observe that most individuals are male and in their forties
to fifties. Some individuals apparently registered on the online platform but did not make any
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purchase. The dataset is fairly imbalanced, as continuing use appears for less than a third of the
customer base.
The dataset is processed as follows. All variables with a skewed distribution are subject to a logtransformation (e. g., number and volume of purchases). The dataset is further split into a training
(n = 283, i. e., 71 %) and test set (n = 110, i. e., 21 %) at the turn of a year in order to rule out
potential confounders from seasonal effects.
Table 1: Model Variables.
Sensitive variables
Age
Gender

Predictor variables
Non-sensitive variables
Number of purchases
Volume of purchases
Days since last purchase
Days since registration
Private/organizational customer

4.2

Outcome variable
Binary label
…continuing use: 110
…churn: 273

Results

The computational results for the regret are presented in Table 2. It reveals that our
masking mechanism hardly affects predictive accuracy. Masking the sensitive attributes often
even leads to a slight increase in the performance of the classification task (negative regret). In
case of shuffling, the performance boost is even significant. Nevertheless, the average change is
still below a percentage point with shuffling being the least regretful masking technique. This is
particularly a promising result as shuffling is also the only method that does not alter marginal
distributions and summary statistics about the sensitive attributes.
Table 2: Prediction results under data masking.
Classifier
Rf
SVM
Lasso
Ridge
Logit
Average

Shuffling
Mean (SD)
CI
-1.95** (1.94)
[-3.33; -0.56]
-0.39** (0.90)
[-1.04; 0.26]
-0.80** (0.97)
[-1.49; -0.11]
-0.70** (0.84)
[-1.30; -0.11]
-0.91** (0.90)
[-1.55; -0.27]
-0.95*** (1.26)
[-1.31; -0.59]

Swapping
Mean (SD)
CI
-0.69 (1.46)
[-0.35; 1.74]
-0.28 (1.07)
[-1.05; 0.49]
-0.67 (0.92)
[-1.33; -0.04]
-0.54 (0.82)
[-1.12; 0.05]
-0.44 (0.69)
[-0.93; 0.06]
-0.25 (1.10)
[-0.56; 0.07]

Replacing
Mean (SD)
CI
-1.22* (1.85)
[-2.54; 0.11]
-0.09* (1.11)
[-0.88; 0.71]
-0.30* (0.84)
[-0.93; 0.30]
-0.31* (0.69)
[-0.80; 0.19]
-0.37* (0.84)
[-0.98; 0.23]
-0.46*** (1.17)
[-0.79; -0.13]

Notes: The table shows the mean regret for m=10 simulations with the standard deviation in brackets. A mean regret different from zero at
the 10 %; 5 % and 1 % significance level is indicated by *; ** or *** respectively. The 95 % confidence interval assumes a t-distribution
with ν =9 (model aggregate: ν =49) degrees of freedom. Regret is computed as the percentage point change in the area under the curve after
masking sensitive data. In case of replacing, missing lower and upper bounds are respectively set to the minimum and maximum value of the
corresponding attribute. Other parameters in subgrouping are left at their defaults. For the evaluation models, hyper-parameters are tuned
using 10-fold repeated cross-validation.

5
5.1

DISCUSSION

Contributions to IS Research

Extant research is dedicated to develop mechanisms and algorithms that transform personal
data to achieve privacy for the individual (Aggarwal and Yu, 2008). There are two streams of
literature that can be divided by the goal of anonymization (Agrawal and Aggarwal, 2001;
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Garfinkel et al., 2007; Li and Sarkar, 2013; Yang et al., 2005) and confidentiality about sensitive
attributes (Hann et al., 2007; Li and Sarkar, 2006; Muralidhar and Sarathy, 2006). However, few
link privacy-preserving methods to predictive analytics, which is concerning given the empirical
evidence that privacy can be extremely costly for data analytics (Brickell and Shmatikov, 2008).
To the best of our knowledge, none of these works explicitly develops a custom predictive
algorithm for information privacy. Prior privacy mechanisms for data masking aim at minimizing
the changes to distributional properties of the data (Li and Sarkar, 2006; Muralidhar and Sarathy,
2006). Predictions – if used at all – merely represents a form of evaluation but not the prime
objective. From an algorithmic perspective, our masking mechanisms are designed to add
perturbations where it is has little interferences with values that are decisive for forming
predictions. Thus, our work addresses an imminent research gap in the area of privacy-preserving
analytics as our proposed mechanism achieves high gains in information privacy, while
simultaneously mitigating effects on the predictive utility.
5.2 Limitations and Potential for Future Research
Our masking mechanism yields no mathematical guarantees of how well the privacy of an
individual is protected in the case of data breaches or other occasions where the data is shared. In
fact, this objective is addressed in the context of differential privacy (Dwork, 2008; McSherry
and Mironov, 2009), while our research acknowledges that firm-user interactions cannot work
without user identification for legal and operational reasons. Instead, our mission is to limit the
use of individual data with regard to certain attributes deemed as sensitive.
5.3 Implications for Management and IS Practice
Information privacy has considerable consequences for firms that want to benefit from the
recent wave of predictive analytics (Chen et al., 2012). Prominent examples from our field
include predictive analytics with the goal of targeted marketing, personalizing customer service
offerings or predicting customer churn. Despite potential benefits, firms now face a dilemma
where privacy-related features have become an integral element of online services, yet where
potential improvements to information privacy remain untapped. For instance, bolstering
information privacy could proof advertising to be more effective (Tucker, 2014) and positively
influence customer purchase behavior (Tsai et al., 2011).
Our empirical findings are encouraging for firms seeking to accommodate both data
sparsity and predictive utility. In fact, our results demonstrate that both are not necessarily
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mutually exclusive. Rather, firms can successfully obfuscate sensitive attributes by perturbing
sensitive attributes without lowering the prediction performance of the corresponding task. This
finding directly benefits managers that want to implement similar approaches in order for
individuals to benefit from a reduced disclosure of sensitive attributes.
The findings become especially relevant as “freemium” remains a dominant business
model in online settings. Even though individuals have been found to be willing to pay for
increased information privacy Hann et al. (2007), the majority rather prefer to save money when
being confronted with the trade-off between sharing personal information and receiving a lower
price (Beresford et al., 2012). Our work especially pertains to firms operating in such settings, as
it might be feasible to increase information privacy with marginal downsides for data-driven
decision-making.
In our work, we deliberately introduce the trade-off between privacy-sensitive attributes and
predictive utility as a managerial decision problem. This allows firms to vary the extent of
perturbation or shuffling depending on the underlying prediction task and the desired loss in
prediction accuracy. Hence, firms can choose to maximize masking in order to attract privacysensitive individuals. Alternatively, they can prefer to bolster firm utility by luring individuals
with personalized product and services. By incorporating our proposed regret metric into
managerial decision-making, it is further possible for firms to quantify the effects of stronger data
masking. This is important because it is difficult for firms to offer individuals more privacy when
they can hardly estimate the value of utilizing less personal information. As a consequence, we
suggest that firms should base their decision about the appropriate privacy mechanism on the
regret of the respective data transformation.
REFERENCES
Adam, N. R., and Worthmann, J. C. 1989. “Security-control methods for statistical databases: A
comparative study,” ACM Computing Surveys (21:4), pp. 515–556.
Aggarwal, C. C., and Yu, P. S. 2008. “A General Survey of Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
Models and Algorithms,” in Privacy-Preserving Data Mining, vol. 34 of Advances in Database
Systems, A. K. Elmagarmid, A. P. Sheth, C. C. Aggarwal, and P. S. Yu, (eds.), Boston, MA:
Springer US, pp. 11–52.
Agrawal, D., and Aggarwal, C. C. 2001. “On the design and quantification of privacy preserving
data mining algorithms,” in Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART
symposium on Principles of database systems, New York, USA: ACM Press, pp. 247–255.
Bansal, G., Zahedi, F. M., and Gefen, D. 2010. “The impact of personal dispositions on
information sensitivity, privacy concern and trust in disclosing health information online,”
Decision Support Systems (49:2), pp. 138–150.
Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San Francisco, December 13, 2018

13

Banholzer and Feuerriegel

Data Masking in Predictive Analytics

Beresford, A. R., Kübler, D., and Preibusch, S. 2012. “Unwillingness to pay for privacy: A field
experiment,” Economics Letters (117:1), pp. 25–27.
Brickell, J., and Shmatikov, V. 2008. “The cost of privacy,” in Proceeding of the 14th ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, New York,
USA: ACM Press, pp. 70–78.
Chen, H., Chiang, R. H. L., and Storey, V. C. 2012. “Business Intelligence and Analytics: From
Big Data to Big Impact,” MIS Quarterly (36:4), pp. 1165–1188.
Culnan, M. J., and Armstrong, P. K. 1999. “Information Privacy Concerns, Procedural Fairness,
and Impersonal Trust: An Empirical Investigation,” Organization Science (10:1), pp. 104–115.
Cynthia Dwork 2006. “Differential Privacy,” .
Duncan, G., and Lambert, D. 1989. “The Risk of Disclosure for Microdata,” Journal of Business
& Economic Statistics (7:2), pp. 207–217.
Dwork, C. 2008. “An Ad Omnia Approach to Defining and Achieving Private Data Analysis,” in
Privacy, Security, and Trust in KDD, vol. 4890 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, F.
Bonchi, E. Ferrari, B. Malin, and Y. Saygin, (eds.), Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 1–13.
Estivill-Castro, V., and Brankovic, L. 1999. “Data Swapping: Balancing Privacy against
Precision in Mining for Logic Rules,” in Data Warehousing and Knowledge Discovery, vol.
1676 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, G. Goos, J. Hartmanis, J. van Leeuwen, M.
Mohania, and A. M. Tjoa, (eds.), Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 389–398.
Fayyad, U., Piatetsky-Shapiro, G., and Smyth, P. 1966. “From data mining to knowledge
discovery in databases,” AI magazine (17:3), pp. 37–54.
Fusilier, M. R., and Hoyer, W. D. 1980. “Variables affecting perceptions of invasion of privacy
in a personnel selection situation,” Journal of Applied Psychology (65:5), pp. 623–626.
Garfinkel, R., Gopal, R., and Thompson, S. 2007. “Releasing Individually Identifiable Microdata
with Privacy Protection Against Stochastic Threat: An Application to Health Information,”
Information Systems Research (18:1), pp. 23–41.
Hann, I.-H., Hui, K.-L., Lee, S.-Y. T., and Png, I. P. 2007. “Overcoming Online Information
Privacy Concerns: An Information-Processing Theory Approach,” Journal of Management
Information Systems (24:2), pp. 13–42.
LeFevre, K., DeWitt, D. J., and Ramakrishnan, R. 2006. “Workload-aware anonymization,” in
Proceedings of the 12th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge discovery and
data mining, New York, USA: ACM Press, pp. 277–286.
Li, N., Li, T., and Venkatasubramanian, S. 2007. “t-Closeness: Privacy Beyond k-Anonymity and
l-Diversity,” in Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE International Conference on Data Engineering,
IEEE, pp. 106–115.
Li, X.-B., and Raghunathan, S. 2014. “Pricing and disseminating customer data with privacy
awareness,” Decision Support Systems (59), pp. 63–73.
Li, X.-B., and Sarkar, S. 2006. “Privacy Protection in Data Mining: A Perturbation Approach for
Categorical Data,” Information Systems Research (17:3), pp. 254–270.
Li, X.-B., and Sarkar, S. 2009. “Against Classification Attacks: A Decision Tree Pruning
Approach to Privacy Protection in Data Mining,” Operations Research (57:6), pp. 1496–1509.
Li, X.-B., and Sarkar, S. 2013. “Class Restricted Clustering and Micro-Perturbation for Data
Privacy,” Management Science (59:4), pp. 796–812.
Lindell, and Pinkas 2002. “Privacy Preserving Data Mining,” Journal of Cryptology (15:3), pp.
177–206.

Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San Francisco, December 13, 2018

14

Banholzer and Feuerriegel

Data Masking in Predictive Analytics

Machanavajjhala, A., Gehrke, J., Kifer, D., and Venkitasubramaniam, M. 2006. “L-diversity:
Privacy beyond k-anonymity,” in 22nd International Conference on Data Engineering, IEEE,
p. 24.
McSherry, F., and Mironov, I. 2009. “Differentially private recommender systems: Building
privacy into the Netflix Prize contenders,” in Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD
international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, New York, USA: ACM
Press, p. 627.
Muralidhar, K., and Sarathy, R. 2006. “Data Shuffling: A New Masking Approach for Numerical
Data,” Management Science (52:5), pp. 658–670.
Narayanan, A., and Shmatikov, V. 2008. “Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets,”
in Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE, pp. 111–125.
Samarati, P., and Sweeney, L. 1998. “Protecting privacy when disclosing information: kanonymity and its enforcement through generalization and suppression,” .
Stone, E. F., Gueutal, H. G., Gardner, D. G., and McClure, S. 1983. “A field experiment
comparing information privacy values, beliefs, and attitudes across several types of
organizations,” Journal of Applied Psychology (68:3), pp. 459–468.
Sweeney, L. 2002. “k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy,” International Journal of
Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems (10:05), pp. 557–570.
Teltzrow, M., and Kobsa, A. 2004. “Impacts of user privacy preferences on personalized
systems: A comparative study,” in Designing personalized user experiences in eCommerce,
pp. 315–332.
Therneau, T. M., Atkinson, and Elizabeth J. 1997. “An introduction to recursive partitioning
using the RPART routines”.
Tsai, J. Y., Egelman, S., Cranor, L., and Acquisti, A. 2011. “The Effect of Online Privacy
Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study,” Information Systems Research
(22:2), pp. 254–268.
Tucker, C. E. 2014. “Social Networks, Personalized Advertising, and Privacy Controls,” Journal
of Marketing Research (51:5), pp. 546–562.
Vaidya, J., and Clifton, C. 2005. “Privacy-Preserving Decision Trees over Vertically Partitioned
Data,” in Data and Applications Security XIXS. Jajodia and D. Wijesekera, (eds.), Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 139–152.
Yang, Z., Zhong, S., and Wright, R. N. 2005. “Privacy-Preserving Classification of Customer
Data without Loss of Accuracy,” in Proceedings of the SIAM International Conference on
Data Mining, Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, pp. 92–102.
Zhu, D., Li, X.-B., and Wu, S. 2009. “Identity disclosure protection: A data reconstruction
approach for privacy-preserving data mining,” Decision Support Systems (48:1), pp. 133–140.

Proceedings of the 13th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, San Francisco, December 13, 2018

15

